Press Release/Commentary by ESPAC posted on December 23, 2004 at 09:59:30: EST (-5 GMT)
SEVEN MYTHS HINDERING PEACE IN DARFUR
The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
Date of Publication: 15 November 2004
Myth: "a fiction or half-truth"
The American Heritage Dictionary (1)
Introduction
In February 2003 two armed groups, the 'Justice and Equality Movement'
(JEM) and the 'Sudan Liberation Army' (SLA), started a war in Darfur, a
region in the west of Sudan. These groups launched attacks on policemen,
government garrisons and civilians in the area. Darfur is an
ecologically-fragile area and had already seen growing - and often armed
- conflict over natural resources between some 80 tribes and ethnic
groups loosely divided between nomads and sedentary communities. Many of
the rebels appear to have been identified within two or three "African"
communities such as the Fur and the Zaghawa tribes. Some of their
civilian targets have included tribal leaders and tribesmen from several
"Arab" tribes. The systematic murder by the rebels of several hundred
policemen and the destruction of over eighty police stations created a
security vacuum that has led to an explosion of inter-communal violence.
It is clear that a variety of armed groups have been active in Darfur
over the past year or so, either as participants in the war or taking
advantage of the turmoil the conflict has caused. This has clearly
included heavily-armed criminal gangs from both sides of the Chad-Sudan
border. The conflict has spiralled out of control and has caused a
growing humanitarian crisis. (2) On 19 April 2004, the government and
rebels signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement as a first step towards
a lasting peace. In November 2004 the Government and rebel movements
extended ceasefire and aid access agreements. (3) The African Union will
be providing both a forum for peace talks and ceasefire supervision. It
is essential that agreements are honoured, monitored and followed
through as the international community attempts both to address the
humanitarian aid needs of those hundreds of thousands of civilians who
have been displaced by the war and to facilitate a political solution to
the conflict. While the ceasefire has been violated from time to time by
all parties to the conflict the bulk of events now in focus happened
before the April ceasefire.
Darfur presents a very complex situation with very complex problems. As
much has been admitted by noted anti-Khartoum critics such as Alex de
Waal. (4) While there can be no simple analysis of the conflict, the
issue has also been caught up in the inevitable propaganda war
invariably associated with all war, and particularly civil war. Simply
put, this propaganda war is clouding and distorting international
perspectives on Darfur. This in turn is unjustifiably pushing
governments into corners and hindering international attempts to
negotiate an end to the crisis. Challenging these myths does not in any
way downplay the seriousness or the extent of the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur or the seriousness of the human rights abuses that have taken
place. It has been a human catastrophe. To the contrary, the challenging
of these myths serves to provide a clearer picture of the reality of
events in Darfur, something that can only make a resolution easier.
Myth 1: THE DARFUR CONFLICT IS BECAUSE OF MARGINALISATION
"The conflict in Darfur has nothing to do with marginalisation or the inequitable distribution of wealth."
Anti-Government human rights Activist Ghazi Suleiman
Virtually all mainstream media coverage of the Darfur conflict has
repeated rebel claims that the rebellion in Darfur began as the result
of Khartoum's marginalisation and underdevelopment of Darfur. (5) These
claims in turn have influenced international views and what is expected
of the Government of Sudan. This media short-hand has, however, been
contradicted by reputable, independent observers. For example, Ghazi
Suleiman, Sudan's most prominent human rights activist (described by
Reuters as "a non-partisan figure who advises senior politicians across
the spectrum" (6)) has concluded: "The conflict in Darfur has nothing to
do with marginalisation or the inequitable distribution of wealth.
Inherently it is a struggle between the two factions of the Sudanese
Islamist movement, the (opposition) Popular Congress party and the
ruling National Congress (party)". (7) Suleiman is referring to the
conflict within the Sudanese Islamist movement following the
government's sidelining of the Islamist eminence grise Dr Hasan Turabi,
a figure seen as having been an obstacle both to the normalisation of
relations with the United States and a peace agreement with southern
rebels. The ruling National Congress party split with hard-liners under
Turabi forming the Popular Congress party opposing peace or any
engagement with Washington. The Justice and Equality Movement, led by
Turabi protégé Khalil Ibrahim, is widely recognised as having been
created by the Popular Congress, many of whose leaders come from Darfur.
JEM insurgents are now also said to be receiving assistance from al-
Qaeda. (8)
Even a cursory review of development issues in Darfur undermines rebel
claims of underdevelopment. Before the present government came to power
in 1989, there were only 16 high schools in Darfur: there are presently
some 250 schools. In 1989 there were 27,000 students in schools; in 2003
there were more than 440,000. In 1989 there was not a single university
in Darfur; there are now three. The number of hospitals in greater
Darfur has increased under this government from 3 hospitals in 1988 to
23 hospitals by 2001. Water pump production in greater Darfur has also
increased from 1,200,000 cubic meters in 1989 to 3,100,000 cubic meters
in 2003. During 2000-2003, the following water projects were implemented
in greater Darfur: the installation of 110 deep ground wells, the
rehabilitation of 133 ground wells, the building of 43 dykes and 30
dams, the drilling of 842 hand pumps and the rehabilitation of 839 hand
pump wells. The total power generation in greater Darfur has risen under
this government from 2,300 kilowatts in 1989 to 4,500 kws by 2000.
Before 1989 there was not a single airport in Darfur; there are now
three. There has been a three-fold increase in paved roads since 1989.
And, politically, Darfur is very well represented at all levels of
Sudanese society. There are eight ministers from Darfur and four
Darfurian state governors. Darfurians are also members of the supreme
and constitutional court. Darfurian representation in the National
Assembly is second only to the southern states.
Myth 2: GENOCIDE IS TAKING PLACE IN DARFUR
"Our teams have not seen evidence of the deliberate intention to kill people of a specific group."
Médecins Sans Frontières
In September 2004, the American Secretary of State, Colin Powell,
responding to domestic pressure from conservative and anti-Islamic
constituencies, declared that events in Darfur constituted "genocide".
This was despite having previously stated two months before events in
Darfur did not "meet the tests of the definition of genocide". (9) His
September comment, in the lead-up to the US elections, was widely seen
as an attempt to divert media attention away from the disastrous events
in Iraq. The American record for crying wolf, in the wake of the Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction fiasco, is clear. Washington's genocide
claims have been criticised by well-respected humanitarian groups such
as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). (10) MSF President Dr Jean-Hervé
Bradol subsequently described American claims of genocide in Darfur as
"obvious political opportunism". (11) Dr Bradol had previously stated
that the use of the term genocide was inappropriate: "Our teams have not
seen evidence of the deliberate intention to kill people of a specific
group. We have received reports of massacres, but not of attempts to
specifically eliminate all the members of a group". (12) Dr Mercedes
Taty, MSF's deputy emergency director, who worked with 12 expatriate
doctors and 300 Sudanese nationals in field hospitals throughout Darfur
at the height of the emergency has also warned: "I don't think that we
should be using the word 'genocide' to describe this conflict. Not at
all. This can be a semantic discussion, but nevertheless, there is no
systematic target - targeting one ethnic group or another one. It
doesn't mean either that the situation in Sudan isn't extremely serious
by itself." (13)
Médecins Sans Frontières is an exceptionally credible observer with
regard to allegations of genocide for two reasons. Firstly, MSF was
amongst the first humanitarian groups to establish a presence in Darfur
as the conflict unfolded. MSF is very heavily involved in the provision
of medical and emergency services in all three of the states that make
up Darfur, deploying two thousand staff. (14) It has been actively
assisting 250,000 people displaced by fighting throughout the region.
Secondly, MSF's reputation is quite simply beyond reproach. Médecins
Sans Frontières was the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. It
has also received numerous other awards recognising its outstanding
humanitarian work throughout the world.
Myth 3: THE GOVERNMENT IS DENYING AID ACCESS TO DARFUR
"It is strange to see that there is still the notion...that...we're completely blocked from accessing Darfur"
UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr Jan Egeland
There have been attempts to claim that the Government has been
systematically denying humanitarian access to Darfur. The facts speak
for themselves. In less than twelve months the Sudanese government has
agreed and facilitated an increase in aid workers present in Darfur,
from two foreigners and a few dozen nationals in September 2003 to just
under six thousand aid workers - over seven hundred of them expatriates
- by August 2004. (15) On 6 July 2004 the government issued fifteen
decrees which addressed, amongst other things, the easing of aid and
relief access to Darfur. In total, there are now 155 locations assisting
with internally displaced people in the three Darfur states, and the
World Food Programme is present in 136 of these centres. (16) There are
now dozens of international and national non-governmental organisations
working in Darfur. Speaking in June 2004, the outgoing UN Humanitarian
Coordinator for Sudan, Mr Kevin Kennedy, confirmed that visas were
generally being granted within 48 hours - as promised by the Government
of Sudan - and that "people are experiencing very few visa
difficulties". (17) The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Jan Egeland, speaking in July 2004, noted: "It
is strange to see that there is still the notion in the world that
nothing is happening and we're completely blocked from accessing Darfur.
We are reaching some 800,000 people at the moment with some sort of
assistance and food." (18) By September 2004, the World Food Programme
was feeding some 940,000 conflict-affected people in Darfur. (19) The
presence of several thousand aid workers in Darfur provides clear
evidence of the Khartoum government's commitment to the provision of
food and medical relief to Darfur's war-affected communities.
Myth 4: THE DARFUR CONFLICT IS RACIAL
"Darfur's Arabs are black, indigenous, African Muslims - just like Darfur's non-Arabs."
Anti-Government human rights activist Alex de Waal
One of the other sensationalist themes is that the conflict in Darfur
has been a racial one in which light-skinned "Arab" tribes have been
engaged in the "ethnic cleansing" of black "African" tribes. (20) These
sorts of claims are particularly inflammatory and very questionable. The
simple fact is that there is very little, if any, racial difference
between the many tribes of Darfur, "Arab" or "African". Both communities
are black. The London Observer newspaper has reported, for example, that
"[c]enturies of intermarriage has rendered the two groups physically
indistinguishable". (21) The UN media service noted: "In Darfur, where
the vast majority of people are Muslim and Arabic-speaking, the
distinction between 'Arab' and 'African' is more cultural than racial."
(22) This reality has been confirmed by prominent anti-government
critics such as John Ryle and Alex de Waal. (23) Ryle has noted that
Arabs and non-Arabs "are generally physically indistinguishable". (24)
Alex de Waal has stated that "Characterizing the Darfur war as 'Arabs'
versus 'Africans' obscures the reality. Darfur's Arabs are black,
indigenous, African Muslims - just like Darfur's non-Arabs." (25) The
New York Times has exemplified contradictory reporting on this issue,
with articles on one hand by their columnist Nicholas Kristof alleging,
for example, that "black Africans have been driven from their homes by
lighter-skinned Arabs in the Janjaweed" (26) while also publishing
subsequent articles such as "In Sudan, No Clear Difference Between Arab
and African". (27) Even "African" Darfurian anti-government figures such
as Dr Eltigani Ateem Seisi contradict the dangerously lazy shorthand of
the New York Times. Speaking at a conference in Brussels he stated with
reference to "Arabs" and "Africans" in Darfur that "we all look alike"
and that one "can't tell from the features if he is Arab or African". He
added that he, an "African", had a lighter skin than many "Arabs". (28)
Myth 5: THERE IS A POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN DARFUR
"there is no systematic target - targeting one ethnic group or another one."
Médecins Sans Frontières
There has obviously been a vast displacement of civilians within Darfur.
A sensationalist media and human rights industry has claimed that the
government has pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing in Darfur. (29) We
have already seen the Médecins Sans Frontières observation that "there
is no systematic target - targeting one ethnic group or another one".
The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Egeland, has
also stated that the term "ethnic cleansing" did not fit events in
Darfur: "I think we have more reports actually of a kind of scorched
earth [policy] - and that nobody has taken over....It's complex, because
some have said that it doesn't fit the legal definition of ethnic
cleansing. The same tribes are represented both among those who are
cleansed and those who are cleansing." (30) Mr Egeland's views have been
echoed by key human rights experts. Asma Jehangir, the UN rapporteur on
extra-judicial summary and arbitrary executions, for example, has said:
"I wouldn't categorise as ethnic cleansing at the moment because that is
not the impression that I am getting. It could be an unintended purpose
but the numbers are staggering, the situation is terrible." (31)
Allegations of ethnic cleansing have also been clearly contradicted by
Sudanese government actions. Far from wishing to see the displacement of
"African" Darfurian communities, the government has self-evidently been
very eager to see these communities returned to their homes. In October
2004, Khartoum reported to the UN that 70,000 displaced people had been
returned to their places of origin. (32) Jan Pronk, the UN Special Envoy
to Sudan, was said to be concerned because neither the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees nor the UN Organisation for Migration had been
consulted prior to the repatriation. While there may well be some
concern as to whether all the returns were voluntary Khartoum's
eagerness to return refugees to their place of origin is manifest.
Myth 6: THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS THE "JANJAWEED"
"[the Janjaweed are] a monster that nobody seems to be able to control."
UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr Jan Egeland
The myth that the government controls the "Janjaweed", the gunmen and
bandits that have been associated with much of the violence in Darfur,
and can turn their activities off and on like a tap has also distorted
the reality of events. Part of the problem has been defining the term
"Janjaweed". A sensationalist media has lumped together as "Janjaweed"
regular army forces, popular defence forces, police units, tribal
militias, armed robbers through to any armed "Arab" tribesman. Virtually
all of Darfur's 80 tribes will have members who are armed, some with
members on both sides of the conflict. Some tribal militias will not
disarm unless rival tribes also do so. A western diplomat in Khartoum
has noted: "There are many gangs or groups that (the Sudanese
government) doesn't control or who may be partly under their control or
controlled by the local authorities. So this is not a clear-cut picture.
That makes you understand how difficult (disarmament) is logistically."
(33) According to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs Mr Jan Egeland "There are many armed groups and
many armed criminal gangs in Darfur." He referred to the Janjaweed as "a
monster that nobody seems to be able to control". (34)
Myth 7: ALL MILITIAS IN DARFUR CAN BE DISARMED IN 30 DAYS
"This is going to take, in my view, 18 months to two years to conclude the first phase"
US State Department official Charles Snyder
Unrealistic expectations based upon naïve and often propagandistic
claims have blighted a resolution of the problem. One issue has been the
problem of disarming the many armed groups and individuals in Darfur. In
July 2004, for example, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution
threatening action against Sudan if it did not disarm gunmen in Darfur
within 30 days. (35) Charles Snyder, a former acting assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs, and the State Department's senior
representative on Sudan, has stated, however, that there are no "30-day,
90-day quick fixes" to the problem. He also admitted: "This is going to
take, in my view, 18 months to two years to conclude the first phase" of
making the region safe for people to return to their homes. (36)
Clearly, every effort must be made to both remove weapons and the
motivation or need to carry weapons from the Darfur situation.
Increasingly shrill demands for an immediate disarmament of armed forces
within Darfur in the face of the reality outlined by Mr Snyder serve no
purpose other than enflaming an already fraught situation.
Conclusion
Why do these myths hinder peace in Darfur? The sorts of disinformation,
misinformation and sensationalism outlined above only further complicate
an already complicated situation. It is very difficult, for example, to
end a conflict said to be about marginalisation and underdevelopment
when at least one of major participants would appear to have a hidden
agenda of overthrowing the Government of Sudan and replacing it with a
more hard-line Islamist regime. Building schools and roads and drilling
more water wells in Darfur, while doubtlessly useful, is not going to
satisfy hard-line Islamist rebels in Darfur any more than reconstruction
projects in Iraq have satisfied Islamist insurgents in that country.
International perceptions of the dynamics of the Darfur conflict, if
based on ideas of marginalisation, will jar at least in part with
reality. It should also be self-evident that claims of genocide and
ethnic cleansing are very serious allegations which can have equally
serious consequences. They must be taken seriously and carefully
evaluated. Given that respected and credible observers such as Médecins
Sans Frontières have gone out of their way to challenge allegations of
genocide and ethnic cleansing in Darfur, the claims must therefore be
treated with considerable caution. These sorts of claims merely serve to
confuse issues and push western governments into short-term measures -
actions that are ill-thought-out and which will only escalate the
crisis.
Notes
1 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth
Edition, Houghton Mifflin, 2000.
2 See "Sudan: One Million At 'Imminent Risk' in Darfur, Says US
Government", News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks,
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 3 March 2004.
3 See "Sudan, Darfur Rebels Sign Pacts to End Hostilities, Aid
Refugees", 'USAToday', 9 November 2004; "Sudan Signs Pacts With Rebels
in Darfur Region", 'The New York Times', 9 November 2004.
4 See, for example, "Tragedy in Darfur: On Understanding and
Ending the Horror", 'Boston Review', October-November 2004, and
"Darfur's Deep Grievances Defy all Hopes for an Easy Solution", 'The
Observer' (London), 25 July 2004.
5 See, for example, "Darfur's Ragtag Rebels Vow to Fight for All
'Marginalized' People", News Article by Agence France Presse, 5 August
2004 and "In Darfur, Black African Rebels Seize Region with Nationalist
Message", News Article by Knight Ridder Newspapers, 26 August 2004.
6 Suleiman is a prominent Sudanese lawyer and chairman of the
Sudan Human Rights Group. A long-standing opponent of the government, he
has been arrested on more than a dozen occasions.
7 "Sudan Islamists use Darfur as Battleground", News Article by
Reuters, 22 September 2004.
8 See, for example, "The New Afghanistan and the Next
Battlefield?", in Richard Miniter, 'Shadow War: The Untold Story of How
Bush is Winning the War on Terror', Regnery Publishing, Washington-DC,
2004.
9 For a full transcript of Powell's comments see "Powell Says
Talks With Sudan Government Yielded Agreement", 1 July 2004 at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200407010005.html.
10 See, for example, "Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans
Frontières Challenges US Darfur Genocide Claims", Mediamonitors, 5
October 2004, available at www.mediamonitors.net
11 "From One Genocide to Another", Article by Dr Jean-Hervé Bradol,
28 September 2004, available at Médecins Sans Frontières (UAE) website,
www.msfuae.ae
12 "Thousands Die as World Defines Genocide", 'The Financial Times'
(London), 6 July 2004. See also, Bradol's views in "France Calls on
Sudan to Forcibly Disarm Darfur Militias", News Article by Agence France
Presse, 7 July 2004.
13 "Violence in the Sudan Displaces Nearly 1 Million. An Aid Worker
Describes the Gravity of the Humanitarian Crisis", News Article by
MSNBC, 16 April 2004.
14 See, for example, MSF's own briefing: "Médecins Sans Frontières
has been working in Darfur since December 2003. Today, 90 international
volunteers and nearly 2,000 Sudanese staff provide medical and
nutritional care in areas with more than 400,000 displaced people.
Medical teams conduct medical consultations and hospitalisation, treat
victims of violence, care for severely and moderately malnourished
children, and provide water, blankets, feeding and other essential items
in Mornay, Zalingei, Nyertiti, Kerenik, El Genina, Garsila, Deleig,
Mukjar, Bindisi, and Um Kher in West Darfur State; Kalma Camp near Nyala
and Kass in South Darfur State; and Kebkabiya in North Darfur State. MSF
also continues to assess areas throughout Darfur. Additional teams
provide assistance to Sudanese who have sought refuge in Chad in Adre,
Birak and Tine, Iriba and Guereda." ("We are looking at a second
catastrophe", Darfur feature article on MSF Australia Website,
http://www.msf.org.au/tw-feature/045twf.html).
15 Figures provided by the UN press office, Khartoum.
16 "Darfur: Humanitarian Emergency Fact Sheet Number 24", US Agency
for International Development, 1 October 2004.
17 "Interview with Kevin Kennedy, Outgoing Acting UN Humanitarian
Coordinator for Sudan", News Article by UN Integrated Regional
Information Networks, Nairobi, 23 June 2004.
18 "Interview with UN's Jan Egeland on the Situation in Darfur",
News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Nairobi, 5
July 2004.
19 "Darfur: Humanitarian Emergency Fact Sheet Number 24", US Agency
for International Development, 1 October 2004.
20 See, for example, "Arab Militias Destroying Schools in Sudan to
Wipe Out Black Culture", News Article by Knight Ridder Newspapers, 20
August 2004.
21 "Empty Villages Mark Trail of Sudan's Hidden War", 'The
Observer' (London), 30 May 2004.
22 "The Escalating Crisis in Darfur", News Article by Integrated
Regional Information Networks, UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 31 December 2003.
23 John Ryle is Chair of the Rift Valley Institute and a Research
Associate of the Centre of African Studies at the University of London.
Alex de Waal is a director of the human rights group, Justice Africa and
a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University. He is
the author or editor or several books, including Famine that Kills:
Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985, Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa
and Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa. De
Waal was formerly a co-director of African Rights and has worked for the
Inter-Africa Group.
24 John Ryle, "Disaster in Darfur", 'The New York Review of Books',
Volume 51, Number 13, 12 August 2004.
25 "Darfur's deep grievances Defy all Hopes for an Easy Solution",
'The Observer' (London), 25 July 2004.
26 Nicholas Kristof, "Cruel Choices", 'The New York Times', 14
April 2004.
27 "In Sudan, No Clear Difference Between Arab and African", 'The
New York Times', 3 October 2004.
28 Comments made by Dr Eltigani Ateem Seisi at the seminar
"Confronting the Crisis in Darfur: A Transatlantic Assessment",
Transatlantic Institute, Brussels, 12 May 2004. Dr Ateem is the head of
Darfur UK, an anti-government group based in Britain.
29 See, as but two examples, "Sudan: Government Commits 'Ethnic
Cleansing' in Darfur", Human Rights Watch, 7 May 2004 and "Ethnic
Cleansing Blights Sudan", News Article by BBC News Online, 27 May 2004.
30 "Interview with UN's Jan Egeland on the Situation in Darfur",
News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Nairobi, 5
July 2004.
31 "Sudan 'Neglecting' Darfur Crisis", News Article by BBC News
Online, 8 June 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/
world/africa
32 "Sudan: 70,000 Darfur IDPs Reportedly Taken Back to Their
Homes", News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 25
October 2004.
33 "Squabble Over Words Obscures Sudan Violence", 'The Los Angeles
Times', 6 November 2004.
34 "Sudan: Interview with UN's Jan Egeland on the Situation in
Darfur", News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks,
Nairobi, 5 July 2004.
35 See, for example, "Sudan Must Act on Darfur in 30 Days or Face
Measures, Security Council Warns", News Article by the United Nations
News Center, New York, 30 July 2004.
36 "U.S. Diplomat Says it May Take 2 Years to Disarm Militias in
Sudan", News Article by Associated Press, 24 September 2004.