Press Release/Commentary by ESPAC posted on November 04, 2004 at 17:48:08: EST (-5 GMT)

THE DARFUR ROAD-MAP, SUDAN AND THE FUTURE

The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
Date of Publication: 4 November 2004

The international community's response to the crisis in Darfur,
especially media coverage, has been varied and in some cases short-
sighted. The key question that has not been asked much is a simple one.
Where does the international community want to be in two years time with
regard to Darfur and Sudan? There are two related questions. How do we
get from A to B and what are the obstacles. In the rush to judgement on
Darfur - premature, misguided and misinformed in some cases - we are
losing sight of these key questions.

The reality of the Darfur crisis is clear. There has been a vicious
civil war in Darfur between two rebel movements, the Justice and
Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army, and the Sudanese
government. Thousands of people have died and hundreds of thousands of
civilians have been displaced in the conflict. It has been a human
disaster.

Any attempt to shape a road-map must start with a word of caution. To
address the Darfur crisis it is essential that events in Darfur are
evaluated as objectively as possible. To do so observers must cut away
the propaganda, media sensationalism and pressure group politics -
especially within the United States - that has already distorted
perceptions of the Darfur crisis and Sudan. (1) That Darfur has been
enmeshed in propaganda is clear. There have been allegations of
genocide, ethnic cleansing and the use of chemical weapons in Darfur.
Such claims, while serving any number of short-term political goals,
complicate an already complex issue. Any solution to the Darfur crisis
has to cut through this propaganda wall and move on. Reputable
international aid agencies have criticised claims of genocide. (2)
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has been one such group. (3) In July
2004, for example, MSF President Dr Jean-Hervé Bradol challenged the use
of the term genocide: "Our teams have not seen evidence of the
deliberate intention to kill people of a specific group. We have
received reports of massacres, but not of attempts to specifically
eliminate all the members of a group". (4) Dr Bradol subsequently
described allegations of genocide in Darfur as "obvious political
opportunism". (5) The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs Mr Jan Egeland stated that the term "ethnic
cleansing" did not fit events in Darfur: "I think we have more reports
actually of a kind of scorched earth [policy] - and that nobody has
taken over....It's complex, because some have said that it doesn't fit
the legal definition of ethnic cleansing. The same tribes are
represented both among those who are cleansed and those who are
cleansing." (6) Claims of the use of chemical weapons in Darfur have
also unravelled. A prominent German newspaper alleged that the Syrian
and Sudanese governments had used chemical weapons against civilians in
Darfur. (7) This claim was soon exposed as misinformation and serves as
a further illustration of the propaganda war surrounding Darfur. (8)

Objectives

What are the objectives that would be set for a Darfur road-map? Again
they are clear. To end the war, stabilise Darfur, negotiate a political
solution to the crisis, re-establish the rule of law in Darfur, assist
those communities that have been displaced to return to their homes,
rebuild and develop Darfur's infrastructure while at the same time
encouraging all parties to Sudan's long-running civil war in southern
Sudan to finalise the peace agreement already largely shaped by the
Machakos and Naivasha protocols. It is also essential for Sudan to
complete its long-standing goal of normalising its international
relations.

Ceasefire and Peace Talks

A ceasefire agreement between the Government and rebels was signed in
early April 2004. (9) This agreement provides for international
monitoring of the ceasefire. The presence of military observers from the
African Union is an essential part of any ceasefire arrangements and
their numbers must be increased when and where necessary to enforce
peace in Darfur. (10) The European Union has played a key part in
facilitating this presence. (11)

Internationally brokered peace talks have taken place in Chad and
Nigeria. At face value negotiating a political solution to the Darfur
crisis should not be difficult. (12) The two rebel movements claim that
they began the war because of the marginalisation and underdevelopment
of Darfur. The formula of devolved regional government that is at the
centre of the Naivasha peace agreement set to end the civil war in
southern Sudan can also be applied to the Darfur issue. (13) Senior
Sudanese government ministers have stated that the Naivasha arrangements
could be a model for Darfur. (14) The key US State Department official
on Sudan, Charles Snyder, has also noted: "The political solution to
Darfur ultimately lies in the federal process within Naivasha that is
the decentralisation of power". (15) And, should Darfur be endowed with
as yet undiscovered and un-exploited oil reserves, they should be
subject to a wealth-sharing arrangement similar to the southern formula.

Those civilians who have been displaced must be returned home to their
villages - villages which in many instances would need to have been
rebuilt - and where necessary improved - by the Sudanese government and
international community.

The Naivasha peace process is the end result of a process of reform,
liberalisation and engagement in Sudan that can be traced back to the
1999 ouster of hard-line Islamist leader Dr Hasan Turabi. In April and
in mid-May 2000, Khartoum indicated its readiness to enter into "an
immediate and comprehensive ceasefire" and to restart negotiations for
the achievement of a lasting peace. Throughout 2001, the Sudanese
government repeatedly called for a peaceful resolution of the southern
conflict. It called upon the SPLA to do the same. (16) With the Bush
Administration's support, the ensuing peace process resulted in the 2002
Machakos protocols and 2004 Naivasha agreement which have brought
southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains to the brink of peace. This
process must be seen through to its conclusion.

Similarly, it is essential that Sudan remains committed to the course of
normalisation of its relations with the international community that had
preceded the Darfur crisis. In 1999, for example, the European Union
entered into a political dialogue with Sudan, noting improvements within
the Sudanese situation. (17) There had also been a similar regional
shift in attitudes towards Sudan and the Sudanese conflict. (18) In
2001, for example, Sudan held the presidency of both the regional
Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as the Community of
Sahel-Saharan States, a body which brings together eleven north African
states. (19) The then newly-elected Bush administration and Sudan
entered into a new relationship, with extensive Sudanese support in
counter-terrorism both before and after the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attacks within the United States. It is also clear that from 1999
onwards the political situation within Sudan has changed significantly.
The former Prime Minister, Umma party leader and key opposition figure,
Sadiq al-Mahdi, declared in 1999, for example, that: "There are now
circumstances and developments which could favour an agreement on a
comprehensive political solution." (20)

What are the Obstacles?

There are, of course, a number of real or potential obstacles along any
Darfur road-map. One of the obstacles has already been touched upon.
International perceptions of the crisis continue to be distorted by the
sort of propaganda claims that go hand-in-hand with all war and
particularly civil war - claims all too often echoed by a sensationalist
media.

The Danger of Hidden Agendas

Another possible obstacle, itself accentuated by undemanding reporting,
is the perception that the rebels are fighting against marginalisation
and underdevelopment in Darfur. Their real objectives have been
questioned by independent observers such as Ghazi Suleiman, a prominent
anti-government human rights activist in Sudan. Described by Reuters as
"a non-partisan figure who advises senior politicians across the
spectrum", Suleiman has noted: "The conflict in Darfur has nothing to do
with marginalisation or the inequitable distribution of wealth.
Inherently it is a struggle between the two factions of the Sudanese
Islamist movement, the (opposition) Popular Congress party and the
ruling National Congress (party)". (21) Suleiman's reference is to 1999
sidelining by Sudan's ruling National Congress party of former Islamist
eminence grise Dr Turabi. Turabi had long been opposed to settling the
civil war in the south and any engagement with the United States. Turabi
then formed a breakaway faction that called itself the Popular Congress.
It is clear that the Justice and Equality Movement is an extension of
the Popular Congress. Turabi has also admitted supporting the Darfur
insurrection: "We support the cause, no doubt about it...we have
relations with some of the leadership." (22) The war in Darfur may be an
attempt to derail the Naivasha peace agreement and Sudan's move towards
the West. Should the objective of the Islamist rebels in Darfur be the
overthrow of the Khartoum government rather than any power-sharing or
devolution for Darfur, then the rebel movements are unlikely to be
negotiating in good faith. Chadian government peace mediators have
documented previous rebel intransigence. Referring to the failed round
of peace talks in December 2003, they observed: "There has been a
breakdown in negotiations because of unacceptable rebel demands. The
talks have been suspended." (23) The rebels have also blocked other
peace deals. The rebels would appear to have a vested interest in the
war and humanitarian crisis continuing to the extent of blocking
humanitarian aid agreements. (24) In these circumstances it will be
difficult to persuade all the anti-rebel militias in Darfur to stand
down.

Darfur and the Naivasha Peace Process

There is no doubt that the Darfur crisis has cast a shadow over the
Naivasha peace process. (25) The Sudanese government has had grounds to
doubt the credibility of their counter-parts in the Naivasha process, Dr
John Garang and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). While engaged
in peace talks with Khartoum, the SPLA have both trained and armed the
Darfur rebels. The International Crisis Group, an organisation very
critical of the Sudanese government, has noted that "numerous sources
link the SPLA to the beginning of the SLA rebellion by providing arms,
training, and strategy...It allegedly trained as many as 1,500
Darfurians near Raja, in western Bahr el-Ghazal, in March 2002." (26)
Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, SPLA spokesmen were still
claiming as recently as September 2004 that the SPLA "has nothing to do
with the present rebellion in Darfur". (27) SPLA leader Dr Garang has
also opportunistically described events in Darfur as "genocide". (28)
The contradictions of the SPLA position are clear. The Naivasha peace
agreement would see the SPLA form part of a coalition national
government - a government which the Darfur rebels it is assisting are
trying to overthrow.

How Do We Get to Where We Want to Go?

The ceasefire must be extended, enforced and monitored. The mission of
the African Union monitors must be supported and assisted. The ceasefire
monitoring and verification teams which have so effectively policed the
ceasefire in southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains must be introduced to
Darfur. The Darfur peace talks must be encouraged and all parties to the
conflict must be held to account by the international community. While
Khartoum appears to be eager to resolve the Darfur issue, any rebel
reluctance, by design or by way of opportunism, to engage in the talks
must be recognised by the international community. Criminality in Darfur
must be dealt with aggressively. The SPLA involvement with and support
for the Darfur rebels must stop. Eritrean support for the rebels must
similarly be ended. Only concerted international pressure can make this
happen.

Criticism of the Sudanese government must be measured and properly
focused. Knee-jerk responses by the international community to
sensationalist and often questionable claims about Darfur serve only to
enflame an already tense situation, endanger the Naivasha peace process
and slow Sudan's re-engagement with the West.

Notes

1 For an overview of propaganda within the Sudanese conflict see,
David Hoile, 'Images of Sudan: Case Studies in Misinformation and
Propaganda', European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London, 2003,
available at www.espac.org
2 "US 'Hyping' Darfur Genocide Fears", 'The Observer' (London), 3
October 2004.
3 See, for example, "Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans
Frontières Challenges US Darfur Genocide Claims", Mediamonitors, 5
October 2004, available at www.mediamonitors.net
4 "Thousands Die as World Defines Genocide", 'The Financial Times'
(London), 6 July 2004. See also, Bradol's views in "France Calls on
Sudan to Forcibly Disarm Darfur Militias", News Article by Agence France
Presse, 7 July 2004.
5 "From One Genocide to Another", Article by Dr Jean-Hervé Bradol,
28 September 2004, available at Médecins Sans Frontières (UAE) website,
www.msfuae.ae
6 "Sudan: Interview with UN's Jan Egeland on the Situation in
Darfur", News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks,
Nairobi, 5 July 2004.
7 See, for example, "Syria Tested Chemical Arms on Civilians in
Darfur Region: Press", News Article by Agence France Presse, 14
September 2004.
8 "US Doubts Report on Syrian Chemical Weapons Testing in Darfur",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 15 September 2004.
9 See "Sudan Government, Darfur Rebels Sign Ceasefire Deal", News
Article by Agence France Presse, 9 April 2004.
10 "African Union Announces Seven-fold Increase to Peace Mission in
Darfur", News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 October 2004.
11 "EU Contributes 100 million Dollars for Darfur Troop
Deployment", News Article by Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 October 2004.
12 "Sudan's Government Expresses Optimism Reaching Solution With
Rebels on Darfur", News Article by Associated Press, 31 October 2004.
13 "Sudan Pledges Political Solution to Darfur Before Talks", News
Article by Xinhua News Agency, 23 August 2004.
14 "Sudan 'Welcomes' Darfur Autonomy", News Article by BBC News
Online, 24 September 2004.
15 "Darfur Peace Lies in Separate Southern Deal - U.S.", News
Article by Reuters, 23 September 2004.
16 See, for example, "Sudan's Government in Favour of Ceasefire in
18-year Civil War", News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 April 2001
and "Government 'Ready for a Ceasefire'", News Article by United Nations
Integrated Regional Information Network, 15 May 2001.
17 "EU and Sudan Agree to Mend Rifts Through Dialogue", 'Middle
East Times', 19 November 1999. See, also, "EU Seeks to Renew Dialogue
with Sudan Broken Off in 1996", News Article by Agence France Presse, 10
November 1999. In July 2000, the countries of Africa also selected Sudan
to represent the continent as a non-permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council. The fifty-three African nations chose Sudan
over Mauritius and Uganda to succeed Namibia as the African
representative on the Security Council. Although ultimately unsuccessful
as the result of intense American lobbying, the Egyptian Foreign
Minister said that "There is an African and an Arab decision in Sudan's
favour concerning this issue."
18 Sudan has over the past several years emerged as a leader of the
region, developments which culminated in Sudan's hosting of the Eighth
Heads of State summit of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) body, as well as the February 2001 Heads of State
summit of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States.
19 Sudan is amongst the first nine of twenty Common Market of East
and Southern Africa member states to implement the first stage of the
envisaged Free Trade Area. This will be Africa's first step towards full
regional integration and a common currency by 2025. See "Sudan to Join
African Free Trade Area", News Article by Reuters, 30 October 2000.
20 "Developments in Sudan Favour National Reconciliation: Mahdi",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 25 December 1999. See, for
example, "Opposition Leader Predicts Solution to Sudan's Conflict", News
Article by PANA, 27 March 2000; "Sudanese Rebel Group to Enter Khartoum
Politics", News Article by Agence France Presse, 20 March 2000; and
"Mahdi's Withdrawal Dents Opposition Alliance", News Article by PANA, 25
March 2000.
21 "Sudan Islamists use Darfur as Battleground", News Article by
Reuters, 22 September 2004.
22 "Peace Still Some Way Off in Sudan", 'Middle East International'
(London), 8 January 2004.
23 "Sudan Govt, SLA Rebels Peace Talks Break Down in Chad", News
Article by Associated Press, 16 December 2003.
24 See, for example, "Sudanese Darfur Rebels Block Aid Pact", News
Article by Reuters, 26 October 2004.
25 See, for example, "Darfur Overshadows the Peace Process in south
Sudan", News Article by IPS, 2 September 2004.
26 "Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis", International Crisis Group,
Africa Report N°76, Brussels, March 2004.
27 "Sudan's Southern Rebels deny Involvement in Crisis in Darfur
Region", News Article by Agence France Presse, 16 September 2004.
28 "Southern Sudan Rebel Leader Accuses Government of Genocide in
Darfur", News Article by Associated Press, 22 October 2004.